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EQUALITY PROVISIONS OF THE SOUTH
AFRICAN CONSTITUTION
Pius Nkonzo Langa*
LL South African Constitutions prior to 1994 were premised on
inequality and a commitment to white supremacy. It is therefore
not surprising that equality has occupied a very special place in
the South African Constitution since democracy was achieved.' The deci-
sive break from the past brought with it the explicit commitment to
equality.
The achievement of equality is identified as one of the founding provi-
sions of the Constitution,2 and the preamble to the Constitution acknowl-
edges that the Constitution must, among other things, "[flay the
foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is
based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by
law." 3
Equality is the first substantive right listed in Chapter 2 of the Consti-
tution. What is protected is the right to equality before the law, and the
provision contains a guarantee of equal protection and benefit through
the law.4
With regard to the limitation of rights, the limiting provision must be
"reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom .. .5
The Bills of Rights of most nations recognize the right to equality, as
do international human rights instruments.6 One of the oldest of such
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1. See Brink v. Kitshoff, 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (SA).
2. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 1, § 1(a).
3. Id. pmbl.
4. Id. ch. 2, § 9(1).
5. Id. § ch.2, 36(1).
6. Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "All are equal
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.
All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declara-
tion and against any incitement to such discrimination." University Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). See also IN'ERNA-
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provisions is the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States, which provides that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 7 This provision is
widely perceived to be a precursor to equality provisions in many modern
constitutions. Similarly, the extensive jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court has influenced much of the jurisprudence on equality in
other jurisdictions. A central principle has been the imposition of differ-
ent levels of scrutiny on different levels of legislative classifications.
The Constitution of India also protects equality and seeks to outlaw
discrimination. 8
In the Canadian case of Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, it
was stated that "the essential meaning of the constitutional requirement
of equal protection and equal benefit is that persons who are 'similarly
situated be similarly treated' and conversely, that persons who are 'differ-
ently situated be differently treated' .....
In Dennis v. United States, Justice Frankfurter recast the equality right
in the following terms: "It was a wise man who said that there is no
greater inequality than the equal treatment of unequals."' 10
Seen in this context, affirmative action is not an exception to the equal-
ity provision, but rather an indispensable and necessary ingredient for the
effective realization of equality. It is important to note, however, that in
the absence of compelling reasons justifying the distinction, laws which
uniformly treat black people differently from white people on the basis of
race would be a violation of the equality provision. It would be necessary
to examine such a law and to give consideration to its content, "its pur-
pose, and its impact upon those to whom it applies, and also upon those
whom it excludes from its application."" The objective is to develop a
"society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized
at law as human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and
consideration." 1 2
The equality provision has both a procedural and a substantive dimen-
sion. Both the substance of the law and its administration must be even-
handed. In the light of the deliberate policies of past governments of
unequal allocation of resources, the equality provisions offer a potent
positive right that can be utilized to ensure speedy governmental action
to equalize the imbalances of the past.
TIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16), art. 26 (1966).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. INDIA CONST. art. 14 and 15(1).
9. [1989] 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 26 (dissenting opinion) (quoting with disapproval from
Court of Appeal opinion).
10. 339 U.S. 162, 184 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
11. Andrews, 56 D.L.R. (4th) at 31.





Section 9(1) guarantees the right to be treated equally by the law, to be
afforded equal protection of the law, and to equally enjoy the benefits of
the law. Equality does not mean that the government can not make clas-
sifications. Persons are classified and treated differently for a variety of
different reasons: people are taxed at different scales; convicted persons
are sent to jail; dentists are regulated differently than engineers; produc-
ers of food are regulated differently to the manufacturers of washing ma-
chines. Thus while the government may legitimately make classifications,
it may only classify people into different groups and afford different
treatment to the different groups if the criteria upon which the classifica-
tions are based are permissible. Whether a classification is permissible
would depend on the purpose of such classification and whether there is a
sufficient link between the criteria used to make the classification and the
government objectives. H.M. Seervai analyzed Indian cases and ad-
vanced the proposition as follows:
Permissible classification must satisfy two conditions, namely, (1) it
must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons and things that are grouped together from others left out in
the group, and (2) the differentia must have a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.1 3
B. COMPARE THE UNITED STATES POSITION
The United States Supreme Court has evolved levels of scrutiny, and
the intensity of the scrutiny is dependent upon the nature of the
classification.
C. THE LOCAL CONTEXT
The equality provision of the South African Constitution in its struc-
ture and content bears a resemblance to a similar Canadian provision. 14
Section 9(2) provides that the right to equality includes the right to full
and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. It permits legislative and
other measures designed to advance persons previously disadvantaged by
race discrimination.1 5
Section 9(3) prohibits unfair discrimination, directly or indirectly, on
certain specified or enumerated grounds, including race, gender, sex,
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orienta-
tion, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and
13. H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (3d ed. 1983).
14. Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Freedoms and Rights provides: "Every
individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and
equal benefit of the law .... Canadian Charter Sec. 15(1) (271).




Section 9(4) prohibits individuals and juristic persons from unfairly dis-
criminating directly or indirectly on any of the grounds listed in Section
9(3). National legislation must be enacted to give effect to the right. Un-
fair discrimination is presumed if it is proved that the person has been
discriminated against directly or indirectly on any one of the grounds
listed in Section 9(3). 17
Unlike the position in the interim Constitution, Section 9 of the final
Constitution makes the equality right horizontally applicable.
D. COMPONENTS OF SECTION 9
1. Equality Before the Law
The concept is described as formal equality and is fundamental to the
rule of law. The principle is that all persons must be treated in the same
manner by the same law.18 Compare S v. Ntuli' 9 where the provisions of
the Criminal Procedure Act differentiated between appellants in prison
who were not legally represented and other appellants who were. The
former had to obtain a certificate from a judge certifying that there are
reasonable grounds for the review before the appeal can be heard. The
Constitutional Court held that two rights were infringed, namely: (a) the
right to have recourse to an appeal or review to a higher court, and (b)
the right equally to have recourse before the law.20 The guarantee of
equality was violated by the fact that the provision imposed greater bur-
dens upon unrepresented prisoners in pursuing their appeals. 21
2. The Right to be Equally Protected by Law and the Right to Equally
Enjoy the Benefits of the Law
Laws which benefit people and those that prohibit or regulate activities
must be equal in their application. Here the court is required to make an
evaluation of the substance and content of the law and determine
whether legislative choices were correctly made.
3. The Right to the Full and Equal Enjoyment of All Rights and
Freedoms
Apartheid laws entrenched and perpetuated a system that favoured a
section of the population and discriminated against the other section.
This left a legacy of inequality which inhibited many people in the enjoy-
ment and exercise of their constitutional rights. The right imposes a posi-
tive obligation on the government to act so as to ensure that everyone
16. Id. at ch.2, sec. 9(3).
17. Id. at ch. 2, sec. 9(3).
18. DAVIS, EQUALITY AND EQUAL PROTECTION: RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
200 (1994).





fully and equally enjoys all rights and freedoms. 22
4. Affirmative Action
The Constitution clearly envisages that affirmative action be seen as
essential and integral to the achievement of equality. Viewed in that
light, it is not a limitation or an exception to the right to equality. Such
measures however must: (a) promote the achievement of substantive
equality, and (b) be designed to protect and advance persons disadvan-
taged by unfair discrimination. 23
5. Unfair Discrimination
The approach is to be found in the clear exposition of the Court in a
number of cases. The leading cases are Harksen,24 Hugo,25 and Walker26
which the relevant headnotes are attached. See in particular the stages
set out in Harksen.
22. Cf. San Antonio Ind. School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
23. E. Mureinik, A Bridge to Where: Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights 1994 (10)
SAJHR 31; see also Motala v. Univ. of Natal, 1995 (3) BCLR 374 (D); C. Sheppard, Liti-
gating the Relationship Between Equity and Equality, ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION
19-20 (1993); Smith, Affirmative Action Under the New Constitution, 1995 (2) SAJHR 84,
86. Smith points out that the decisions in the United States whether affirmative action
programs are permissible have been ambivalent. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v.
Weber, 443 US 193 (1979).
24. Harksen v. Lane NO, 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC).
25. President of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC).
26. City Council of Pretoria v. Walker, 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC).
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